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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE ROLE DOMESTIC courts should play in the adjudication of interna-tional law, not only in its enforcement, but also in the interpretation and hence the  ‘ development ’ of international law is of increasing interest to inter-
national lawyers. 1 
 This chapter contributes to this most recent and normative turn in the discussion 
of the role of domestic courts in international law. It does not aim to do so gener-
ally, however, but looks at the adjudication and hence interpretation of international 
human rights law by domestic courts. It argues that international and domestic 
human rights adjudication processes are best understood together as one single pro-
cess: transnational human rights adjudication. After explaining the specifi cities of 
that process, the contribution argues that international human rights law and adju-
dication should not be taken too readily as a core case or example in the general dis-
cussion of domestic judicial law-making in international law, or at least not without 
serious qualifi cations. 
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 The proposed argument is four-pronged. Section II maps the discussion of inter-
national law adjudication by domestic courts and explains how it is becoming 
more normative. Against the background of those discussions, Section III identifi es 
where the puzzle of international human rights adjudication lies. In Section IV, the 
argument explores the specifi cities of international human rights adjudication by 
international and domestic courts, before articulating, in Section V, a transnational 
interpretation of those unique features and functions. 
 Methodologically, the contribution approaches the question of international 
human rights adjudication from the perspective of human rights theory, and, more 
precisely, from the perspective of a legal theory of human rights. It aims to pro-
vide the best interpretation and justifi cation of the existing practice of international 
human rights law, that is, one that puts the practice in its best light. 2 To that extent, 
the contribution does not merely aim to propose a moral theory of the legitimacy of 
domestic adjudication in the human rights context that could then be used to reform 
existing practice. Nor, however, is it about reconstructing the practice as a theory 
and hence merely about justifying it. There is a space between utopia and apology. 
The practice of international human rights law entails its own immanent justifi ca-
tions and critiques, and those are the justifi cations and critiques that need to be 
identifi ed and interpreted in the proposed theory of human rights adjudication so as 
to best fi t the practice while at the same time justifying and criticising it. 3 
 For reasons of scope, the argument advanced focuses mostly on the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR)). While this may be criticised for falling prey to 
a regionalist bias as well as to a judicial one, both critiques may be countered. As 
I will explain in the conclusion, much of what I will argue may be transposed  muta-
tis mutandis to the universal level and to the future World Court of Human Rights 
if it ever comes into existence. The same may be said, albeit with some fi ne-tuning, 
about United Nations (UN) human rights treaty bodies that are non-judicial in their 
reasoning and interpretation of international human rights law. 4 One may argue, 
indeed, that they have jurisdiction to monitor and not to interpret international 
human rights law, 5 but that this provides for even more scope for interpretation 
by domestic courts in human rights adjudication in the end. In any case, it is actu-
ally quite common for human rights scholars to include all those judicial and non-
judicial international bodies in the same discussion. 6 
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 II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ADJUDICATION BY DOMESTIC COURTS 
 After a summary of the discussion of the role of domestic courts in the adjudication 
of international law to date, I will introduce what one may take as a recent norma-
tive turn in the discussion. 
 A. The Discussion to Date 
 To date, international legal scholars ’ discussions of the role of domestic courts in 
the adjudication of international law have been largely descriptive and of a socio-
logical kind. Most authors have sought to assess the  ‘ effects ’ of domestic courts on 
international law, and more generally, to explain the  ‘ role ’ domestic courts ’ decisions 
have played in the interpretation and hence development of international law. 7 This 
has been done mostly in general terms, but also, recently, within specifi c regimes of 
international law where the role of domestic courts has been greater, such as inter-
national responsibility law or international immunities law. 8 
 In a nutshell, those discussions may be said to have branched out in three direc-
tions. Authors have identifi ed and discussed: the legal bases for domestic courts ’ 
engagement with international law and the various types of engagement therewith; 
the variables in the international law framework that affect that engagement in prac-
tice; and the various effects domestic courts ’ decisions have had in international law. 
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 i.  The Legal Bases for Domestic Courts ’ Engagement with International 
Law and the Types Thereof 
 Some of the legal bases or grounds for the duty or, at least, for the right or power of 
domestic courts to apply, and hence to interpret international law in their decisions 
have been clarifi ed in the literature. 9 The fi rst distinction one has to draw in this 
regard is between international and domestic legal bases. 
 With respect to  international legal bases, one should mention the following in 
particular. First of all, the principle of primacy of international law binding the state 
(and its courts as agents of the responsible state in case of violation of international 
law), and the principle of consistent interpretation of international law that derives 
from it (in monist and dualist orders alike). This duty of compliance extends to a 
duty of domestic courts to abide by the international framework of interpretation of 
international law (and in particular to comply with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)). 10 , 11 Second, one should mention the 
principle of exhaustion of local judicial remedies that applies in some cases in order 
for an international court to then acquire jurisdiction. 12 This principle implies a 
primary obligation for states to set up domestic judicial remedies in case of violation 
of international law. This may be connected, thirdly, to the explicit duty of states 
under international human rights law to guarantee a judicial remedy for any viola-
tion of international law, including a domestic judicial remedy. 13 Fourth, the prin-
ciple of  ‘ substantive ’ subsidiarity 14 applies in some cases, mostly in the context of 
international human rights law, 15 and governs the ability of an international court to 
impose a new interpretation. As we will see, this principle requires that  international 
courts observe a  ‘ consensus ’ or  ‘ common approach ’ 16 among states before iden-
tifying a new interpretation of international law on that basis, thus implying that 
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domestic courts in particular are the actors responsible for changes in the interpre-
tation of international law. Finally, one can allude to the requirement of domestic 
judicial enforcement in some cases. This makes domestic courts the main agents of 
the  restitutio in integrum following a violation of international law and the condem-
nation by an international court. 17 
 As to the  domestic legal bases for domestic courts ’ engagement with international 
law, one should mention the following bases. First of all, the constitutional require-
ment of incorporation or transposition of international law into domestic law (for 
example, whether the domestic legal order is monist or dualist), and hence into the 
corpus of valid domestic law applicable by domestic courts and their material juris-
diction. Second, the principle of separation of powers, and that of judicial review of 
the executive and the legislature based on any valid law under the jurisdiction of the 
domestic court and that may include international law. Finally, constitutionalism, 
and the related principle of (internationalised) constitutional review of other domes-
tic institutions and their decisions. 
 Three remarks are in order with respect to these various legal bases and in par-
ticular to the types of engagement with international law they justify or require. 
First of all, while some of these legal bases are legal grounds for  duties of domestic 
courts to apply and interpret international law, others give rise to mere  rights or 
powers for them to do so. Only a few of them ground both rights and duties. This 
is a factor that needs to be taken into account in the discussion of the legitimacy of 
domestic courts ’ engagement with international law and of the authority of their 
interpretations. Secondly, while some of those legal bases cover the right or duty 
to both enforce  and interpret international law, not all of them do so. This should 
also be kept in mind later on when considering the legitimacy of domestic courts ’ 
decisions. Finally, some of these legal bases and the various duties/rights they foresee 
may enter into confl ict, and this makes things complicated. There may in particular 
be tensions between the  domestic and  international legal duties and/or rights of 
domestic courts. One may, for instance, think of tensions between the courts ’ duty 
of constitutional fi delity, on the one hand, and the identifi cation of a customary rule 
on state  immunities, on the other. 18 
 ii.  The International Framework Variations in Domestic Courts ’ Engagement 
with International Law 
 Various factors in the international law framework, which affect the engagement 
of domestic courts with international law in practice, have been uncovered in the 
literature. 19 One could mention the following in particular. 
 First of all, there are the sources of international law at stake. When the inter-
national law norms interpreted stem from customary international law or general 
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principles, the effects of domestic courts ’ judicial interpretations on the interpreted 
norm are greater than they are in the case of treaties. This has to do with the validat-
ing role of the judiciary with respect to norms stemming from those sources of inter-
national law. This is as true for domestic courts as it is for international courts. 20 
Secondly, there are the norms of international law at stake. When the norms of 
international law interpreted are indeterminate, there is more scope for their inter-
pretation and contextualisation, and hence there is a greater role for any interpreter, 
including a domestic court. Thirdly, there are the duties of international law at stake. 
When the norms of international law at stake give rise to interstate duties, it is 
less likely that domestic courts will be called to enforce and hence interpret them. 
Even when they do, they are not usually alone in doing so. Things are different 
when the norms applied generate intra-state duties, as is the case with international 
immunities law or international human rights law, for instance. Fourthly, there may 
be an international court with jurisdiction. The existence of one or many interna-
tional courts with (compulsory or non-compulsory) jurisdiction affects the leeway 
given to domestic courts in the interpretation of international law. This is clear from 
areas such as international humanitarian law and international environmental law, 
for instance, where there are few or no international courts exercising jurisdiction. 
Finally, there is the monist or dualist nature of the domestic legal order at stake. This 
feature of the relevant domestic legal order affects the scope of its domestic courts ’ 
jurisdiction and hence whether and how they interpret international law. This point 
has, however, become largely moot in practice, especially with respect to customary 
international law and general principles. 21 
 iii. The Effects of Domestic Courts ’ Engagement with International Law 
 With respect to the effects of domestic courts ’ engagement with international law, 
the primary distinction to draw is between their legal effects (that is, whether or not 
domestic decisions have some kind of legal authority for subjects of international 
law based on the existing sources of international law) and their non-legal effects 
(that is, whether or not domestic decisions trigger other kinds of reaction on the 
part of subjects of international law, international institutions and courts or other 
domestic institutions and courts). 22 
 When assessing the legal effects of domestic courts ’ decisions pertaining to inter-
national law, it is important to distinguish between the role of domestic courts as 
enforcers of international law ( qua organs of their respective states) and the corre-
sponding (relative) decisional authority of their decisions, on the one hand, and their 
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role as interpreters and hence as judicial law-makers of international law and the 
corresponding (general) interpretative authority of their decisions, on the other. 23 
This is a key distinction mentioned above by reference to the legal bases for domes-
tic courts ’ engagement with international law, and hence to the different powers or 
duties of domestic courts with respect to either the enforcement or the interpretation 
of international law. Note that I am not considering the legal effects of domestic 
courts ’ interpretations of international law in domestic law  qua (source of judicial) 
domestic law. Those effects are obvious, and are only of indirect interest within 
international law (for example, for the establishment of state nationality for the 
purpose of diplomatic protection). 
 If one focuses exclusively on the  legal authority of domestic courts ’  interpretations 
of international law from the perspective of the  sources of international law , differ-
ent ways for these courts to exercise legal authority can be identifi ed by reference to 
different sources of international law. 
 First of all, domestic courts ’ interpretations of international law may be consid-
ered as evidence of or even as the content of either one of the two constitutive ele-
ments of customary international law (either  opinio juris or general practice 24 ), but 
also of treaty law (Article 38(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ Statute)). 25 This might be evidence provided to an international court 
or another domestic court, or to any subject of international law. This has been 
confi rmed by the practice of the ICJ in the context of intra-state duties in particular, 
for instance in decisions pertaining to the international law of immunities. 26 Such 
sources of legal authority are sometimes referred to as material sources of interna-
tional law. 
 Secondly, domestic courts ’ interpretations of international law may also be con-
sidered as evidence or as content of the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations and, most of the time, by domestic courts in those civilised nations 
(Article 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute). 27 This might be evidence provided to an international 
court or another domestic court, or to any subject of international law. Again, such 
sources of legal authority are referred to as material sources of international law. 
 Thirdly, domestic courts ’ interpretations of international law may also be con-
sidered as a process of validation of another source of international law such as 
customary international law or general principles, or treaty law (Article 38(1)(d) 
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ICJ Statute). 28 Here, one refers to domestic courts ’ interpretations as an auxiliary or 
subsidiary formal source of international law. Indirectly, this acknowledges interna-
tional judicial law-making as a process of international law-making. 29 It is rarer for 
domestic courts to be recognised as such than for international courts, however. 30 
This would be even more controversial with respect to domestic courts. 31 And thus, 
fourthly, when domestic courts ’ interpretations of international law are considered 
as a process of validation of international law, they are usually taken to so operate 
only in a gradual and collective fashion: it requires many simultaneous domestic 
courts ’ interpretations for them to validate a norm stemming from a formal source 
of international law applicable to all of them. 32 This is due to the principle of  ‘ self-
interpretation ’ by states that prevails in international law. In this context, the inter-
pretation by one of those self-interpreting state ’ s domestic courts cannot claim any 
authority outside that state ’ s legal order. If it does, then it is as one among many 
states ’ practices constitutive of the general  ‘ subsequent practice ’ of states which 
establishes the agreement of those states according to Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, and 
hence as a constitutive element of some form of interpretative custom. 33 Of course, 
domestic courts ’ interpretation of international law may be trumped by that of an 
international court with the ultimate authority to interpret (provided there is such an 
ultimate international interpreter in the case at hand, which is rare). 
 Interestingly, in all four types of legal authority of domestic courts ’ interpretations 
of international law, but especially in the fi rst two, interpretations of international 
law may be taken not only for what they are formally (that is, domestic courts ’ 
decisions) with the legal authority that goes with it, but also, more substantially, 
as epistemic emulations of what the international courts ’ interpretations of that 
same norm of international law could look like. 34 When this is the case, what is at 
stake is some form of theoretical or epistemic authority distinct from the practical 
legal authority discussed so far. Furthermore, the self-referential dimension of the 
judicial law-making process may be worth emphasising. While the self-referential 
nature of the reasoning of international courts which know that, when they interpret 
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 international law, their interpretation will become part of the law they are interpret-
ing is a well-known and inescapable diffi culty, it is more problematic in the case of 
domestic courts. Indeed, the latter courts ’ impact on their object of interpretation 
is less immediate and the concurrent interpretation by other domestic courts largely 
indeterminate for them. This is particularly the case as, along the lines discussed 
above, their rights and duties to engage with international law under international 
and domestic law may enter into confl ict. 
 B. A Normative Turn 
 Most recently, the discussion about the role of domestic courts in international law 
seems to have been taking a normative turn, leaving previous sociological consid-
erations aside, but also providing more than the usual passing reference to Scelle ’ s 
 d é doublement fonctionnel . 35 Authors have started to focus on the evaluation of the 
impact, but also of the justifi cation of the authority of domestic courts ’ decisions in 
international law. 36 
 In short, the questions one should be asking now are: How can the authority of 
the decisions by domestic courts be justifi ed in international law ? How should the 
decisions be issued or reasoned, that is, what are the applicable principles, standards 
or criteria ? What priorities can be justifi ed in cases where they confl ict ? 
 Various positions could be defended. Some authors have mentioned, for instance, 
a duty of  ‘ systemic integration ’ based on a systemic argument about the international 
legal order. 37 Others have proposed an argument drawing from the international 
rule of law. 38 But there could be many others. Whatever they are, it is important that 
their discussion is conducted with suffi cient precision and rigour. 
 At this stage, the main diffi culty seems to be that adjudication as a source and 
function in international law is the least mature of all sources and functions. With-
out entering into too much detail, it is suffi cient to remember that most of the time 
there is no single court of international law, but many of them. In fact, there is not 
always a court and, when there is one, their jurisdiction is not always compulsory. 
Moreover, judicial law-making still sits uneasily with the original sources of inter-
national law, and in particular with state-made international law and especially the 
self-interpretation of international law. It is no wonder that international law adjudi-
cation remains one the most diffi cult questions from the perspective of international 
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legal philosophy today. 39 In turn, this uncertainty necessarily hampers the discussion 
of the legitimate authority of domestic courts ’ decisions in international law. Sec-
ondly, a connected legal theoretical diffi culty is the distinction between domestic and 
international law, and the way one should best conceive of their relationship in one 
or many legal orders. Clarity on those issues is a pre-condition to any discussion of 
the relationship between domestic judicial law-making and international law. 
 Finally, whatever the duties of domestic courts and the standards applied, there 
are also important practical issues to consider. For instance, the problem of resources 
and the sheer diffi culty for domestic courts to work with international law, hence the 
enhanced risk of selectivity in the choice of the international law applied or inter-
preted (for instance, many domestic courts focus on international courts ’ decisions 
only and not on primary sources of international law) or even some of the strategic 
biases present (for instance, there is a lot of cherry-picking of the international legal 
norms that best suit the domestic court ’ s purpose or argument). This is especially 
problematic in the context of the interpretation of general international law (for 
example, of international law rules on sources, interpretation and responsibility). 
Of course, whether these practical diffi culties, and especially the strategic risk, are 
greater for domestic courts than they are for international courts remains to be 
demonstrated. 
 This chapter contributes to this most recent and normative turn in the discussion 
of the role of domestic courts in international law. It does not aim to do so gener-
ally, however, but looks at the adjudication and hence interpretation of international 
human rights law by domestic courts. 
 III. THE PUZZLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
BY DOMESTIC COURTS 
 There is a very simple puzzle about the role of domestic courts in international 
human rights adjudication which anyone familiar with both international human 
rights law and international dispute settlement will recognise. It has to do with the 
sources of international human rights law, on the one hand, and with the interna-
tional courts in place to monitor its application, on the other. 
 To start with, the sources of international human rights law are largely conven-
tional. There are countless international and regional human rights treaties in place, 
and at least most of them are ratifi ed very broadly. Thus, the sources of international 
human rights are not only or mainly customary international law. To that extent, 
they differ from other areas of international law where domestic courts have con-
tributed effectively to the interpretation of international law in practice (including to 
the latter ’ s identifi cation as exemplifi ed in the law of international responsibility or 
of international immunities). 
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 Moreover, international human rights law is one of the few international law 
regimes with international courts in place (though only regional so far) that exercise 
compulsory jurisdiction. In this respect again, it is unlike other areas of international 
law where the impact of domestic courts has been important in the absence of an ulti-
mate international law interpreter (in lieu of self-interpretation). In areas such as the 
law of international responsibility or the international law on immunities, indeed, 
domestic courts have gradually contributed to the development of an interpretative 
custom in the absence of an international court ’ s authoritative interpretation. 
 Still, and this is the puzzle, domestic courts ’ decisions do actually contribute to 
a high degree to the interpretation of international human rights law in practice. 
Furthermore, their interpretations of international human rights law are granted, at 
least by international human rights courts, a form of legal authority that goes further 
than any of the four types of legal authority of domestic courts ’ interpretations of 
international law mentioned before. 
 In response to this puzzle, this contribution makes two claims: one is substantive 
and the other is methodological. 
 First of all, international human rights law, and hence its adjudication, are special 
because human rights are special. Based on their special nature, I would like to argue 
that domestic courts should be understood as the primary adjudicators of human 
rights, and that this should in turn be refl ected in the way international human rights 
adjudication works in relation to domestic courts. To refl ect this, I defend the view 
that both levels of human rights adjudication are best referred to as forms of  ‘ trans-
national ’ human rights adjudication. 
 Secondly, and as a result, international human rights law and adjudication should 
not be taken too hastily as a core example in the general discussion of the role of 
domestic courts in international law, or at least not without serious qualifi cations. 
It is confusing to take international human rights law as a central example, besides 
international investment law or trade law, and then to consider the specifi cities of 
international human rights law (in particular, as giving rise to inter-state and non-
reciprocal duties) as generalisable and then transferrable into other areas of interna-
tional law. 40 
 IV. THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
ADJUDICATION 
 The specifi c features of international human rights adjudication in practice, and 
especially the role of domestic courts, are best justifi ed by reference to the demo-
cratic argument of mutual validation between domestic and international human 
rights law. More specifi cally, this argument fi ts and justifi es three dimensions of our 
contemporary human rights practice: the kinds of norms, sources and adjudication 
one encounters in international human rights law. 
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 A. The Mutual Validation of Domestic and International Human Rights Law 
 Given the mutual relationship between human rights  qua equal rights and (basic 
moral) equality, and in turn between (basic moral) equality and political equality 
and hence democracy, 41 human rights ought to be mutually identifi ed and their 
duties specifi ed, allocated and fulfi lled in a democratic community and through dem-
ocratic processes. 42 In the current state of international relations, this means in the 
relevant state having jurisdiction over the individual in question. Of course, because 
human rights and democracy are in mutual tension and constitution, human rights 
should also constrain those democratic communities in return, and cannot merely 
be defi ned by democratic procedures. This mutuality between human rights and 
democracy is one of the many complexities of human rights. 43 
 Interestingly for our purpose, the egalitarian and hence democratic dimension of 
human rights, but also the mutuality between them, is actually refl ected in the way in 
which international human rights law developed: through the practice of democratic 
states, but in a way of transnational consolidation that has gradually constrained 
their practice in return. Historically, indeed, much of the content of international 
human rights treaties was drawn from domestic bills of rights existing in 1945, and 
many of the latter were then revised post 1945 to be in line with the former. So, 
international human rights law consolidated out of that practice and constrained 
that practice in return. 
 No wonder then that in the current human rights law system one can no longer 
fi gure out domestic or internal human rights without their international or external 
counterparts and, of course, vice versa. This virtuous circle has been perpetuated 
since then in the way in which domestic and international legal norms pertaining 
to human rights have been interpreted and developed together. This is what I have 
referred to elsewhere as the mutual validation and legitimation of domestic and 
international human rights law. 44 
 B. The Mutuality of Human Rights Norms, Sources and Adjudication 
 The argument about the mutual validation and legitimation between domestic 
and international human rights law helps account for at least three dimensions of 
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 international human rights law and its practice: the type of norms, sources and, most 
importantly for us in this contribution, adjudication one encounters in international 
human rights law. 45 
 First of all, the argument for the mutual validation and legitimation between 
domestic and international human rights law accounts for the special type of  norms 
one encounters in international human rights law. To start with, in a very unusual 
fashion for international law norms, international human rights law gives rise to 
(inter-state and even  erga omnes ) duties to incur (intra-state) human rights duties 
vis- à -vis individuals under the given state ’ s jurisdiction. Those duties to recognise 
human rights correspond, I have argued elsewhere, to the international right to have 
(domestic) human rights. 46 Thus, international human rights have to be matched by 
corresponding domestic human rights, which they then complement as minima both 
in content and with respect to their (personal and territorial) scope. Despite sharing 
the same content and structure (albeit minimally), international human rights are 
therefore not redundant alongside domestic human rights. 47 Nor, however, are they 
merely about fi lling the latter ’ s gaps. On the contrary, they fulfi l complementary 
functions that make them interdependent with domestic human rights, and necessar-
ily arise and function together. Furthermore, international human rights norms are 
(abstract) rights, and, as such, their corresponding duties need to be specifi ed every 
time anew. This can only be done in the relevant domestic and political context by 
domestic institutions. The corresponding international duties can only be abstracted 
therefrom  ex post by international courts. 
 Secondly, the mutual validation between domestic and international human rights 
law also accounts for the special type of  sources of international human rights law 
and their relation to domestic sources of human rights law. First of all, interna-
tional human rights have long been guaranteed by treaties that developed out of 
domestic human rights guarantees. International human rights are also, however, 
concurrently of a customary nature 48 — and not only additionally so when there are 
gaps in the conventional protection of human rights. 49 Indeed, international human 
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rights law, even when primarily of a conventional nature, also actually includes the 
interpretation of international human rights treaties that is constitutive of an evo-
lutive and subsequently consolidated practice and  opinio juris , that is, of an inter-
national human rights custom. Such a custom may be assessed in the traditional 
way — involving both practice and  opinio juris and not in a diluted fashion only 
(for example, based on  opinio juris only). 50 As to objections to the existence of 
customary international law in the human rights context, they may all be met by 
reference to the type of state practice required (for example, intra-state and not 
only interstate practice, and including omissions, not only actions) and the kind of 
consistency it should display (for example, justifi cations of violations count towards 
consistency). 51 Last but not least, international human rights may also be regarded 
as general principles of international law, although here the intimate relationship 
between principles as norms and principles as sources in international law does not 
make for much clarity. 52 
 All three sources work as bottom-up processes of international human rights law-
making drawing from domestic practices of human rights and constraining them 
in return. This combination of sources in international human rights law explains 
why international human rights treaties themselves are often regarded as sources of 
general (non-party relative) and objective (non-consent-based) international law. 53 
It also explains how international human rights treaties can relate directly to domes-
tic human rights in practice. International human rights are, for instance, the only 
treaty norms that are immediately valid in domestic law independently of whether 
the domestic legal order endorses monism or dualism. Of course, one may wonder 
in those conditions why one should still hold onto human rights treaties as the main 
source of international human rights law. This may be explained by the need to set 
interpretative minima and constraints. The latter may evolve in practice, as demon-
strated by the adoption of protocols to the ECHR, for instance. 
 Finally, and centrally for this contribution, the mutual validation between domes-
tic and international human rights law also accounts for the specifi c kind of adjudi-
cation one encounters in international human rights law, both at the international 
and the domestic levels. 
 Internationally, human rights protection has long been monitored by  international 
(although mostly regional so far) courts (or bodies) that guarantee the respect of 
the minima consolidated in international human rights law. Importantly, however, 
those courts may only proceed with their monitoring function once domestic judicial 
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remedies have been exhausted ( ‘ procedural subsidiarity ’ ). 54 In turn, their review 55 
decisions are declaratory (albeit binding, of course), thus most of the time calling 
for some form of domestic remedial enforcement ( ‘ remedial subsidiarity ’ ). 56 Finally, 
and most importantly, those courts may and should only offer new interpretations 
of international human rights law in the course of their monitoring activity when 
those are based on an existing transnational human rights practice ( ‘ substantive sub-
sidiarity ’ ). 57 They also have to adapt their past interpretations when those no longer 
correspond to the existing transnational human rights practice. 
 In short, therefore, international human rights courts do not work as ultimate 
interpreters or umpires. To that extent, they are really unlike other international 
law courts whose interpretative authority derogates from the principle of self-
interpretation that prevails in international law (for example, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) for European Union law or the ICJ for international 
law). Instead, international human rights courts are facilitators of the self-inter-
pretation of their human rights law by states: they help crystallise and consolidate 
states ’ interpretations and practices of human rights and the custom stemming from 
their subsequent practice of human rights treaties. Once identifi ed and entrenched as 
international law, the minimal human rights interpretation can then be re-imposed 
on domestic authorities. This is often referred to as the interpretative authority or 
 erga omnes effect of an international human rights interpretation or decision, an 
authority very different from an autonomous and ultimate supranational interpre-
tative authority. 58 This mode of adjudication and its interpretative authority actu-
ally fi t the customary nature of international human rights law itself: international 
human rights courts work as custom-identifi ers and -validators. 59 
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 All this in turn explains why the interpretation methods used by international 
human rights courts are often described as being specifi c by comparison to those that 
apply within other regimes of international law: 60 their interpretation should evolve 
with their subsequent transnational practice which the international human rights 
courts identify and validate (Article 31(3)(b) VLCT). This is how the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) approaches what it refers to as the  ‘ European con-
sensus ’ , 61 that is, a form of interpretative custom among states parties. 62 It is based 
on states ’ general practice (based on an average ratio of 6 out of 10 states) 63 and 
their  opinio juris verifi ed by reference, for instance, to domestic and international 
courts ’ decisions and to other international human rights law norms. 64 The evolutive 
nature of this joint or transnational interpretative process by reference to consensus 
in practice is sometimes also referred to as the  ‘ dynamic interpretation ’ of interna-
tional human rights law. Interestingly, it is then used as a basis for either a systemic 
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or a teleological interpretation; dynamic interpretation does not therefore amount to 
a distinct method of interpretation, but only to a tool in any of the latter. 65 European 
states ’ common approach or consensus constrains the Court ’ s dynamic interpreta-
tion and guides it. According to the ECtHR, the reference to consensus and the evo-
lution of state practice amounts to a duty, and not just a possibility. 66 
 In turn, the special features of human rights adjudication by international human 
rights courts also imply an enhanced role for  domestic courts. This is what all three 
types of subsidiarity require. It is also a consequence of the democratic contextu-
alisation of international human rights law given the crucial role of the judiciary in 
post-1945 constitutional democracies and the entrenchment of conventional judi-
cial review in international human rights law. As a matter of fact, international 
institutional and procedural standards for the implementation and monitoring of 
human rights have been developed internally in cooperation between democratic 
states, transnationalised and internationalised bottom-up, and then imposed top-
down again as external constraints on domestic institutions and procedures. 
 This explains in turn why international courts work in priority with domestic 
courts in the interpretation and development of international human rights law, and 
only indirectly with domestic legislative or executive authorities. 67 It is rare, for 
instance, to fi nd an international human rights court refer, in its assessment of a 
new consensus between states, to state practices outside of the decisions of domes-
tic courts and their interpretations of international human rights law. 68 Their legal 
authority (for international human rights courts, in particular) is much greater than 
that of domestic courts ’ other interpretations of international law. It is with respect 
to the fourth kind of authority described previously, in particular, that their author-
ity seems to be enhanced: domestic courts ’ custom-identifying and custom-validating 
role is largely recognised in international human rights law. 
 V. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
AS TRANSNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
 The proposed argument and reading of international human rights law has various 
implications for international human rights adjudication in practice: some general, 
pertaining to its transnational nature, and others more specifi c, pertaining to the 
respective functions of international and domestic courts. 
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 A. Transnational Human Rights Adjudication 
 The mutual regime of international human rights law-making I have just argued for 
and its anchoring in state practice I have presented, are best referred together to as 
 ‘ transnational ’ , 69 and not merely as domestic and international respectively. 70 The 
transnational nature of human rights law has implications for the role of human 
rights adjudication in transnational human rights law-making and the relations 
between domestic and international human rights courts in that process. 
 First of all, adjudication plays a specifi c role in the transnational development 
of human rights law. Judicial interpretations are suffi ciently fl exible to evolve with 
the practice of states and the customary nature of international human rights law. 
Judicial distinction and overruling may always be possible either way. 71 Moreo-
ver, the  ‘ judicial custom ’ that stems from international courts ’ decisions 72 can in 
turn be incorporated into the customary corpus of international human rights law. 
Finally, more substantive justifi cations for the role of adjudication in the develop-
ment of human rights law may be put forward, including the kind of moral reason-
ing that characterises judicial reasoning when contrasted with other forms of legal 
reasoning. 73 
 Secondly, transnational human rights adjudication implies its mutuality, and this 
in turn means that neither domestic nor international interpretations should take 
priority in case of confl ict. Since international and domestic human rights law com-
plement each other and are in productive tension, their interpreting institutions 
should be understood as situated in a joint albeit complementary interpretative 
endeavour over the same human rights 74 and not as mutually exclusive interpretative 
authorities. 75 There is no clear priority of either judicial body in case of  confl icting 
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interpretations of the corresponding human rights duties, unlike in other regimes 
of international law. This differs from the way they would relate if they belonged 
to different political communities and corresponding legal orders. 76 This is because 
their respective claims to legitimate authority are not distinctly justifi ed on different 
bases and in an exclusive fashion, but, on the contrary, share a mutually reinforc-
ing democratic justifi cation. Thus, it is the international human rights institutions ’ 
potential contribution to democratic processes or compensation for the lack thereof 
domestically that helps justify its legitimate authority in those cases in which they 
impose certain human rights interpretations on domestic authorities. 77 Just as inter-
national human rights contribute to protecting the right to democratic membership 
and the right to have human rights in a democratic polity, international human 
rights institutions protect domestic democratic institutions and guarantee their abil-
ity to respect human rights. 
 All this explains in turn how domestic courts are sometimes justifi ed when diverg-
ing from international human rights courts ’ interpretations, while, on the other 
hand, having to comply with them in other cases. The transnationality of the system 
may lead to a signifi cant amount of levelling-up, but it also allows for some levelling-
down if most states change their practice together. On an individual state level too, 
saving clauses are usually in place in international human rights treaties to protect 
higher domestic protection (for example, Article 53 ECHR). One should also men-
tion the possibility of a persistent objection to the transnational practice of states 
and their consensus, for instance in a sensitive moral context. 78 Conversely, if the 
state practice shows that a given interpretation and type of human rights duties are 
to be entrenched and should not be restricted for any reason, then the high degree 
of protection of those core duties should be regarded as ensuing from state practice 
and a prior consensus of states parties, and not as being imposed top-down by the 
international human rights court. 
 Note that the idea of  ‘ pluralism ’ of human rights ’ interpretations is not an ade-
quate model to capture the way in which complementary and distinct human rights ’ 
interpretations relate in case of confl ict. 79 It is perceptive with regard to the imme-
diate validity and lack of hierarchy among international or regional and domestic 
human rights norms, but misses the mutuality and reciprocal validation and legiti-
mation process at stake. There is, in fact, much more than judicial politics and judi-
cial dialogue at work here, if one is to explain the process of mutual interpretation 
and reasoning at play. There are reasons, in other words, behind international or 
European judges ’ and domestic judges ’ cooperation, reasons that go beyond judicial 
attitudes and strategies and their mutual respect for each other ’ s beliefs. 
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 B.  The Transnational Functions of Domestic and International Human Rights 
Courts 
 Specifi c normative implications of the proposed transnational reading of interna-
tional human rights law ensue for the respective functions of domestic and interna-
tional human rights courts. 
 With respect to  international human rights adjudication, one should mention the 
following. International human rights courts should not behave as ultimate inter-
preters and authorities unlike other international courts interpreting international 
law (and, actually, unlike domestic constitutional courts in any constitutional sys-
tem), 80 but merely help in identifying and validating a general subsequent state prac-
tice that has turned, or is turning, into a custom. 
 This is particularly important for the way international human rights courts them-
selves approach the authority of their decisions, with respect to both their inter-
pretative and their decisional authority. 81 More specifi cally, in terms of reasoning 
and method, international human rights courts should focus more openly on the 
customary nature of international human rights law and adjudication. This means 
a more consistent and systematic reference to state consensus (and related concepts 
such as subsidiarity, states ’ margin of appreciation, evolutive interpretation and so 
on), 82 and clarity about the ways to identify that consensus  qua subsequent practice 
and agreement of states and interpretative custom. 83 Specifi cally, this may imply 
adopting a comparative human rights law method. 84 Of course, it would have to be 
adapted to international law for it to be suffi ciently transnational and reciprocal. 85 
It should not only be unilateral, therefore, and merely applied as a way to ascertain 
other sources of theoretical or epistemic authority as opposed to practical or legal 
authority. Nor should it exclude international law from its scope. More resources 
and more rigour with respect to the scope and depth of the comparative survey (for 
example, how many states, which practice in those states, and what degree of varia-
tion) are required to do so effectively in practice. 
 With respect to  domestic human rights adjudication, the following implications 
of the transnational endeavour may be identifi ed. Domestic courts should engage 
with international human rights law more strongly than they usually do with other 
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regimes of international law. They should make the most of the procedural, sub-
stantive and remedial subsidiarity that are protected by international human rights 
law. Specifi cally, this means engaging with international human rights courts ’ past 
decisions and reasoning, but also with other domestic courts. Through constant dis-
tinguishing of and reasoning with those decisions, they can contribute to the devel-
opment of their transnational human rights law. 86 
 Of course, there is no duty of integrity or consistency with international courts ’ 
decisions or other domestic decisions, and no obligation to consider transnational 
human rights decisions as precedents: this would jeopardise the dynamic develop-
ment of a democratic consensus on human rights. It is the role of international 
human rights courts to identify and validate that consensus but only once it has 
occurred, and not to trigger it. Otherwise, the democratic dimension of the con-
textualisation and allocation of human rights would not be respected, and the con-
sensus would become a strategic one. Of course, once transnational decisions have 
become a general subsequent practice and a new consensus or transnational custom 
is validated by a given international human rights court, they bind domestic courts 
 qua new international human rights custom. To that extent, domestic courts ’ duties 
when interpreting international human rights law differs from their duties in other 
fi elds of international law adjudication: there is no maximal international standard 
to be interpreted uniformly out there, but that standard is moulded and developed 
through concurrent domestic interpretations. 
 At the same time, however, engaging effectively with other international and 
domestic human rights courts means treating transnational precedents as at least 
persuasive. 87 Local circumstances may be comparable and domestic human rights 
interpretations could be consciously  ‘ boiler-plated ’ , to borrow Jeremy Waldron ’ s 
terms, 88 in real time as it were and before being constrained by international inter-
pretations based on their transnational consensus. Paying attention to those transna-
tional decisions helps domestic courts contribute more quickly and more effi ciently 
to the development of a consensus and state practice that will become binding for 
them in return. It also enables them to make an argument of change with respect 
to the transnational interpretative consensus of a given human right and to hope to 
trigger a judicial dialogue with international human rights courts and maybe bring 
about a new international interpretation of that right, as I have argued above. This 
interpretation actually fi ts and justifi es the new advisory procedure under ECHR 
Protocol 16. That procedure provides domestic courts which request it with a non-
binding interpretation of the state of the European consensus or, at least, the emerg-
ing consensus 89 on any human rights question, thus enabling the domestic court to 
decide by reference to that consensus. 
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 Interestingly, an important argument against this kind of one-to-one practice of 
comparative human rights law is that using human rights ’ interpretations stemming 
from other domestic institutions than those of one ’ s own country would be a clear 
violation of the democratic principle. 90 It follows from the argument in this chapter 
about the mutual validation and legitimation of domestic and international human 
rights law, however, that comparative constitutional law may not only provide the 
best way to grasp the interpretative content of the transnational human rights prac-
tice at stake. 91 It also means that transnational human rights may be vested with 
some indirect democratic legitimation through the respective democratic processes 
by which they have gradually been recognised. 
 VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 There are three conclusions one may draw from the proposed argument. 
 First of all, international and domestic human rights adjudication are best under-
stood together as one single process: transnational human rights adjudication. One 
cannot and should not work without the other, and this has implications for the 
way domestic and international human rights courts should respectively apply and 
interpret international human rights law. This fi rst conclusion also applies outside 
the jurisdiction of the ECtHR and other regional human rights courts. It is the case 
for a future World Court of Human Rights, although the identifi cation and con-
solidation of the subsequent state practice and agreement may be far more diffi cult 
to achieve on a global scale. 92 It also matters for non-judicial human rights treaty-
bodies. Although they do not have the judicial authority to function directly as inter-
national custom-validators, 93 they can contribute to the clarifi cation of a subsequent 
state practice and are part of the transnational adjudication process (for example, 
through general comments collating and systematising domestic case law). 
 Secondly, international human rights law and adjudication should not be taken 
too readily as a core example in the general discussion of domestic judicial law-
making in international law, or at least not without serious nuancing. This would 
imply, for instance, bearing in mind the lack of ultimate authority of international 
human rights courts ’ interpretations, the international and domestic courts ’ duties to 
consider other domestic decisions and international decisions and law, and the joint 
custom-validating function of domestic courts ’ interpretations. The norms, sources 
and adjudication of international human rights law are very different from laws 
which prevail in other regimes of international law. No wonder then that the types 
 90  On those critiques, see McCrudden (n 70) 501ff, 529ff; Waldron (n 70) 412ff. 
 91  See Besson,  ‘ Human Rights and Constitutional Law ’ (n 43). 
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 & International Affairs  197 . 
 93  See also  Andr é  Nollkaemper and  Rosanne  van Alebeek ,  ‘ The Legal Status of Decisions by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law ’ in  Helen  Keller and  Geir  Ulfstein (eds),  Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies: Law and Legitimacy ( Cambridge University Press ,  2012 ) . 
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and grounds of domestic courts ’ powers and duties to engage with international law 
differ a lot between international human rights law and other regimes of interna-
tional law. And so does their legal authority. This second conclusion should be a con-
cern both for future scholarship on domestic courts and international law, and for 
future scholarship on human rights. Of course, one cannot exclude the possibility 
that more international law will develop on the model of international human rights 
law in the future and become transnational in this way, especially in the remaining 
constitutional areas that have not yet been covered by international law, where intra-
state duties are at stake and where judicial reasoning is central. If this happened, 
then the same implications for the engagement of domestic courts with international 
law would probably ensue. But it is too early to say and there is too much to lose 
in the way we conceive of the rights and duties of domestic courts engaged in the 
interpretation of international law, on the one hand, and of domestic human rights 
adjudication, on the other, if we continue to merge the two discussions. 
 Last but not least, politically speaking, the proposed transnational reading of 
human rights adjudication has important implications for the way we deal with the 
growing resistance to international human rights courts and bodies in democratic 
and non-democratic states alike. The message that academics should convey is that 
those courts and bodies cannot be identifi ed with other international courts, and 
cannot and should not claim ultimate interpretative authority over domestic courts. 
More importantly, provided they comply with the duties stemming from their com-
plementary and mutual functions with domestic courts, those international human 
rights courts and bodies should not be disparaged from a democratic perspective. 
Quite the contrary: they contribute to the consolidation and development of our 
democratic values and principles. Nor should domestic judges fear to engage with 
international human rights law and courts for this is the only way international 
human rights law can develop and be interpreted transnationally and hence demo-
cratically. In this respect, and contrary to what many human rights scholars have 
been saying, recent restatements of the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation in major international human rights instruments, like the new ECHR 
Protocol 15, are a step in the right direction. 
 
 

